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ABSTRACT
We present a novel variational generative adversarial network
(VGAN) based on Wasserstein loss to learn a latent repre-
sentation from a face image that is invariant to identity but
preserves head-pose information. This facilitates synthesis of
a realistic face image with the same head pose as a given in-
put image, but with a different identity. One application of
this network is in privacy-sensitive scenarios; after identity
replacement in an image, utility, such as head pose, can still
be recovered. Extensive experimental validation on synthetic
and real human-face image datasets performed under 3 threat
scenarios confirms the ability of the proposed network to pre-
serve head pose of the input image, mask the input identity,
and synthesize a good-quality realistic face image of a de-
sired identity. We also show that our network can be used
to perform pose-preserving identity morphing and identity-
preserving pose morphing. The proposed method improves
over a recent state-of-the-art method in terms of quantitative
metrics as well as synthesized image quality.
1. INTRODUCTION
Sensor-equipped, algorithm-driven smart living spaces of
the future promise to deliver increased energy efficiency,
health benefits, and productivity gains [5, 4, 13, 18]. This
will require recognition of occupant’s activities, gestures,
body pose, facial expressions, etc. While it can be accom-
plished using video cameras, their use will likely raise pri-
vacy concerns which can hinder further development [7]. One
approach to address privacy concerns is to obscure visually-
identifying information via explicit image manipulation, such
as pixelization, blurring, cartooning, etc. However, such
manipulation may also obscure utility information, such as
facial expression or gesture. An alternative approach is to
seamlessly alter occupant’s identity in an image without sig-
nificantly degrading image quality and utility information.
This idea was first proposed for facial expression classifica-
tion in Privacy-Preserving Representation-Learning VGAN
(PPRL-VGAN) framework [3]. Specifically, a VGAN was
trained to learn an identity-invariant latent representation
of an input face image from which a realistic image could
be synthesized with the same facial expression as the input
image, but a different, user-specified identity.
Fig. 1: Pose-preserving identity replacement in a human-head im-
age. An input image is encoded into an identity-invariant latent rep-
resentation z, which is then concatenated with target identity infor-
mation c and fed into the decoder to generate an identity-altered im-
age while preserving the original head pose.
In this paper, we extend the PPRL-VGAN framework to
head-pose estimation and introduce several innovations in its
architecture and training. Specifically, this paper makes the
following contributions:
1. We extend PPRL-VGAN that was developed for facial
expression classification (a discrete attribute), to head-
pose estimation (a continuous attribute). This requires
learning regression functions in addition to classifica-
tion functions.
2. We substantially modify the PPRL-VGAN architecture
to stabilize the training process and improve pose esti-
mation accuracy (customized naı¨ve inception modules
[16], gradient-penalty Wasserstein GAN cost function
[2], Adam optimizer [9]).
3. We introduce an additional image-reconstruction loss
term in the generator’s cost function to improve the vi-
sual quality of generated images.
4. We provide quantitative and qualitative validation of
our approach on synthetic and real-world datasets un-
der three different privacy-threat scenarios.
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5. We demonstrate our method’s capability to perform
pose-preserving identity morphing and identity-preserving
pose morphing of facial images by interpolating, re-
spectively, the identity code and latent representation
within the generator.
2. RELATED WORK
Privacy-Preserving Head Pose Estimation: There is an
extensive body of literature devoted to image-based human
head pose estimation spanning several decades. Focusing
on identity-invariant head pose estimation, early works such
as [14, 15] used classical statistical learning approaches that
emphasized differences between head poses while suppress-
ing differences between identities. In more recent work, [12]
develops a deidentification filter on video sequences of car
drivers and then estimates a driver’s gaze, head dynamic, etc.
In [5], a non-linear regression method is proposed to estimate
human head pose from extremely low resolution images in
which identity is visually imperceptible. However, the afore-
mentioned methods either only produce coarse-grained head
pose estimates [14, 15, 12] or perform below par in head pose
estimation [5].
Invariant Representation Learning: Invariant representa-
tion learning has been extensively studied in various contexts.
Recent studies [6, 10, 17] utilize VAEs with adversarial train-
ing to learn an invariant latent space which also enables gen-
erating new data samples. Our method also leverages VAEs
and GANs, but unlike these works we apply adversarial train-
ing in the image space instead of the latent space. This creates
better quality images. Particularly relevant to our work is the
PPRL-VGAN proposed in [3] to learn an identity-invariant
face image representation that preserves a discrete set of facial
expressions. Our proposed framework is similar to PPRL-
VGAN in the use of a VGAN, but significantly differs from it
in ways described above in the list of contributions.
3. BACKGROUND MATERIAL
Variational Auto-Encoder (VAE): consists of an encoder
(Enc) network and a decoder (Dec) network. The encoder
maps a given data sample x into a lower-dimensional latent
representation z. The decoder maps z back to data space:
z ∼ Enc(x) = q(z|x), xˆ ∼ Dec(z) = p(x|z)
The encoder and decoder are jointly trained to minimize a
VAE loss function which is a combination of a reconstruction
term and a prior regularization term:
LV AE
x
= −Eq(z|x)[log(p(x|z))] +DKL(q(z|x)||p(z))
where z ∼ p(z) = N (0, I) is a prior for the latent distribu-
tion which regularizes the encoder training and DKL is the
Kullback-Leibler divergence.
Generative Adversarial Network: A plain GAN consists of
a generator network (G) and a discriminator network (D) that
are trained by a min-max game competition. Whereas G ad-
justs its weights to map a source of noise z ∼ pz(z) to the
data space, D aims to reliably distinguish real data samples
x ∼ pd(x) from fake data samples G(z). The output from
the discriminator can be interpreted as a probability that the
input data is real. In practice, the two networks are optimized
in an alternating manner via a loss function:
min
G
max
D
Ex∼pd(x)[logD(x)] + Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
L(G,D)
Wasserstein GAN (WGAN) [2]: WGAN is an important
extension of GAN which improves image quality and stabi-
lizes training. In the plain GAN formulation, optimizing the
networks according to the minimax objective is equivalent to
minimizing the Jensen-Shannon (JS) divergence between the
data distribution pd and the distribution parameterized by the
generator network pg . The JS divergence is, however, po-
tentially discontinuous in the generator’s parameters which
makes training difficult [8]. WGAN instead proposes to min-
imize the Wasserstein distanceW (pd, pg), which is a smooth
function of network parameters (under minor technical con-
ditions):
W (pd, pg) = max
ω:Dω(x)∈F1
Ex∼pd [Dω(x)]− Ex∼pg [Dω(G(z))]
where F1 is the set of 1-Lipshitz functions. In order to en-
force 1-Lipshitz continuity, we follow previous work [8] and
a gradient penalty term γEx∼ph(x)[(||∇xDω(x)||2 − 1)
2] to
the cost function, where γ > 0 is a tuning parameter, ph(x) =
cpd(x) + (1− c)pg(x) and c ∈ [0, 1].
4. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
Let x be a given face image with one (discrete) identity la-
bel yid ∈ {1, ..., Ns}, where Ns is the number of distinct
subjects, and three (fine-grained continuous) head pose labels
ypose = {y1pose, y
2
pose, y
3
pose} corresponding to the yaw, pitch
and roll angles respectively. Our proposed framework has two
objectives: 1) to produce a low-dimensional image represen-
tation z which is invariant to identity information but retains
the head pose attributes, and 2) to synthesize a realistic face
image with the same head pose as the input image, but a tar-
get identity specified by an input identity code c(ys), where
ys ∈ {1, ..., Ns} is generated from a distribution p(ys) and
c(·) is the one-hot encoding function.
The generator in our model is structured similarly to a
VAE. The encoder network encodes an input face image x to
a representation z ∼ Enc(x) and the decoder maps the latent
representation z in combination with an identity code c back
to the image space. The discriminatorD consists of three net-
works: D1ω, D
2 andD3. TheD1ω network is a detector which
Fig. 2: Proposed VAE WGAN. Training alternates between optimizing G and D. Each inception module performs convolution on an input
tensor with filters of sizes 1×1, 2×2, and 4×4, and the results are concatenated to produce an output tensor.
is trained to predict if the input image is real or generated, the
D2 network is a classifier which is trained to recognize the
identity of the person in the input image, and theD3 network
is a regressor which is trained to estimate the three head pose
angles of the input image.
For identity yid, the decoder is trained to generate an ac-
curate reconstruction of the input xˆ ∼ Dec(z, c(yid)). For a
randomly sampled identity ys, the decoder is also trained to
synthesize a realistic face image xˆ′ ∼ Dec(z, c(ys)) so that
discriminatorD2 classifies it as the target identity ys while si-
multaneously ensuring that regressor D3 correctly estimates
the head pose of the input image x. Specifically, the genera-
tor’s weights are updated to minimize the cost
LG = E(x,yid,ypose)∼pd(x,yid,ypose),ys∼p(ys)
[
− λG1 D
1
ω(G(x, c(ys)))− λ
G
2 log(D
2
ys
(G(x, c(ys))))+
λG3
3∑
i=1
|yipose −D
3
i
(
G(x, c(ys))
)
|+
λG4 ||G(x, c(yid))− x||
2
2 + λ
G
5 DKL(q(z|x)||r(z))
]
(1)
whereDω(x) ∈ F1,D2i is the predicted probability of the i-th
identity, D3i (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) are the predicted pose angles, λ
G
i
(i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) are tuning factors, and r(z) ∼ N (0, I) is
the prior distribution of the latent representation. In compari-
son to the PPRL-VGAN generator cost function, ours adopts
the WGAN formulation forD1 to stabilize training. Further-
more,D3 is optimized to accurately estimate the (continuous)
head pose angles from an input image as opposed to recogniz-
ing facial expressions. For the pose-angle loss, we used the
L1 norm of the difference between the predicted pose angles
and the ground-truth pose angles. There is no need for angle
unwrapping since the datasets used in our experiments con-
tain face images with head pose angles limited to [−90◦, 90◦].
We acknowledge that alternative loss functions could be used
for penalizing pose estimation error, e.g., geodesic loss, how-
ever comparing different loss functions is out of the scope
of this work. Lastly, the additional L2 reconstruction error
term (the term attached to λG4 ) assists the model in generating
good-quality images.
The discriminator is optimized to maximize the dual form
of the Wasserstein distance between the real data distribution
and the generator’s distribution. When given a real training
sample, it is also trained to accurately recognize the person’s
identity and head pose. This is accomplished by updatingD’s
weights to maximize the cost
LD = λ
D
1 {Ex∼pd(x)[D
1
ω(x)]−
Ex∼pd(x),ys∼p(ys)[D
1
ω(G(x, c(ys)))]}+
E(x,yid,ypose)∼pd(x,yid,ypose)[λ
D
2 log(D
2
yid
(x))−
λG3
3∑
i=1
|yipose −D
3
i (x)| ]−
λD4 Ex∼ph(x)[(||∇xD
1
ω(x)||2 − 1)
2]
(2)
where λDi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) are tunable weighting factors.
The last term in Eq. (2) punishes the gradient to ensure that
D1ω is a 1-Lipschitz function of x. A significant point of
difference compared to PPRL-VGAN is that our discrimi-
nator’s cost function leverages the WGAN formulation via
a gradient-penalty on D1ω. Another major difference is our
use of a (continuous) head pose estimation loss in lieu of the
(discrete) expression recognition loss used in PPRL-VGAN.
The weights of G and D are updated in alternating order.
Over successive rounds of training, the generator learns to fit
the real data distribution and synthesize images that can fool
D. As the input code c(ys) determines the identity of the syn-
thesized image, the encoder is encouraged to eliminate infor-
mation about the identity of x in the latent space. Moreover,
as xˆ′ must preserve the head pose of x, the encoder is also
encouraged to embed head pose attributes within the latent
space. The reconstruction objective in Eq. (1) additionally
encourages the encoder to pass head pose information to the
latent space and promotes synthesis of good quality images.
5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluated the performance of the proposed model on the
UPNA head pose dataset and its synthetic replica [1, 11].
Both datasets contain 10 videos for each of 10 subjects. In
total, one dataset includes 35,990 frames. Ground-truth con-
tinuous head pose angles (yaw, pitch, roll) and a face-centered
bounding box are provided for each frame. In our experi-
ments, we first cropped each frame using the provided bound-
ing box and then resized it to 64×64-pixel resolution. For
each subject, we selected 80% of the frames from each video
for training and used the remaining 20% for testing.
We compared our model with PPRL-VGAN [3] which
was modified to preserve continuous head poses by replac-
ing the facial expression classifier in the discriminator with a
head pose estimator and changing both generator and discrim-
inator cost functions to encourage preservation of head pose
information within the latent and synthetic image spaces.
5.1. Quantitative evaluation
We used the methodology in [3] to evaluate pose-preserving
identity replacement performance under three threat scenar-
ios.
Attack scenario I: This is the least privacy threatening case
wherein the attacker has access to the original training images
with their ground-truth labels (xtrain, y
train
id ). However, all
the test images have been passed through the trained model
with a randomized identity ys for privacy protection. The
attacker can train an identifier using the unaltered training
set and apply it to the privacy-protected test images xˆ′test =
G(xtest, c(ys)) to predict their underlying ground-truth iden-
tities ytestid .
Attack scenario II: This is a more challenging scenario in
which the attacker can access the privacy-protected training
images xˆ′train = G(xtrain, c(ys)) that have been processed
by the trained model, and the attacker knows the correspond-
ing ground-truth identity labels. As a result, the attacker can
train an identifier on the training set that has been protected
using the same transformation as the test set. It is possible
that attacker’s identifier can uncover the underlying identity
of a protected test image if the proposed model fails to elimi-
nate information about the original identity in the synthesized
image.
Attack scenario III: Here the attacker has access to our
model and thus can obtain the latent representation z for a
given image x. Therefore, the attacker can train an identifier
using (ztrain, y
train
id ) and apply it to the representation ztest
of a test image to predict its identity.
In order to assess how well pose is preserved in the syn-
thesized images, we trained a dedicated head pose estimator
for each scenario using the available type of training images
and their ground-truth head pose labels. We then applied the
trained estimator to the test images to measure the head pose
estimation performance.
We use correct classification rate (CCR) and mean abso-
lute error (MAE) to measure the performance of identification
and head pose estimation, respectively. In all three scenarios,
a low identification CCR and a small head pose estimation
error are favored. The identification and head pose estima-
Scenarios
Identification(%) MAE Average(°)
Ours
PPRL-
Ours
PPRL-
VGAN VGAN
Privacy Unconstrained 99.97 0.69
Attack Scenario I 10.23 9.92 2.251 3.57
Attack Scenario II 23.31 21.64 1.811 2.90
Attack Scenario III 21.33 23.71 2.212 2.76
Table 1: Classification CCRs for person identification and MAE
for head pose estimation on UPNA.
Scenarios
Identification(%) MAE Average(°)
Ours
PPRL-
Ours
PPRL-
VGAN VGAN
Privacy Unconstrained 100.00 0.60
Attack Scenario I 10.06 10.47 2.27 5.68
Attack Scenario II 26.51 17.36 1.74 3.65
Attack Scenario III 24.49 25.16 2.10 2.77
Table 2: Classification CCRs for person identification and MAE
for head pose estimation on UPNA synthetic.
tion performance of the two competing models under various
scenarios are reported in Table 1 for the UPNA dataset and
Table 2 for its synthetic version. In the privacy unconstrained
scenario, both training and testing data are unaltered. The re-
sulting identification CCRs lower-bound the attainable iden-
tification accuracy while the resulting head pose estimation
MAEs upper-bound the attainable estimation error. In attack
scenario I, we observe that the identification performance of
both models is close to pure chance (10% for both datasets
since each includes 10 subjects). This indicates both methods
succeed in protecting identity when the attacker has no knowl-
edge about the applied privacy-protection transformation. As
for head-pose estimation, we can see our model consistently
outperforms the benchmark method by 1-3 degrees. In attack
scenario II, the identification CCRs of both methods are close
but higher than those in attack scenario I by 7-17%. This sug-
gests a certain amount of the identity information has leaked
into the synthesized images. However, the resulting CCRs are
still much lower than those in the privacy unconstrained sce-
nario. In terms of preserving head pose, the proposed model
again outperforms the benchmarkmethod on the two datasets,
more than halving the error. As for attack scenario III, the
identification and pose estimation performance of both meth-
ods are similar. Overall, the proposed model outperforms the
benchmark method in preserving the head pose information
and has comparable performance in terms of disentangling
identity information.
5.2. Qualitative evaluation
Identity replacement: Once trained, our model can synthe-
size a new face image (see Fig. 3) with the same head pose as
the input image and a target identity specified by the identity
code c(ys). Compared to the images generated by PPRL-
VGAN, the synthetic images from our model have better vi-
sual quality (e.g., contain fewer artifacts) and preserve the
head pose attribute more accurately.
Interpolating latent representations (pose morphing): In
order to further evaluate the generative capability of the
proposed model, we conducted additional experiments for
identity-preserving pose morphing: given a pair of source im-
ages xinitial, xfinal with the same identity but different head
pose, and their corresponding latent representations zinitial,
zfinal, we linearly interpolate between zinitial and zfinal to
generate new representations as follows:
zinterp = kzinitial + (1− k)zfinal, k ∈ [0, 1].
Then, we synthesize new images by passing (c(yid), zinterp)
to the decoder. We observe that the head pose of synthesized
images changes smoothly with k (see Fig. 4), suggesting that
our model can capture salient head pose characteristics in the
latent space.
Interpolating identity codes (identity morphing): We also
linearly interpolated between two identity codes cintial and
cfinal to create new identity codes cinterp as follows:
cinterp = kcinitial + (1− k)cfinal, k ∈ [0, 1].
Then, we passed the generated code with a fixed image rep-
resentation (capturing pose) to the decoder. Interestingly, our
trained model can generate a sequence of face images that ex-
hibit a seamless transition from the initial identity to a target
identity, i.e., face morphing (see Fig. 5), despite the fact that
the model can only see one-hot codes specifying a discrete set
of identities during training.
6. CONCLUSION
We presented a framework for learning an identity-invariant
image representation which retains fine-grained head pose at-
tributes. Quantitative results show that our model outper-
forms a recent state-of-the-artmethod for learning an identity-
invariant image representation. Our model also enables syn-
thesis of a realistic face image with a desired identity. Finally,
our model can be applied to other image tasks such as pose or
face morphing.
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